The Asper Biogene Case: Why GDPR's DPO Independence Requirement May Be Pointless in Practice
A surprising Estonian court decision raises fundamental questions about one of GDPR's most rigid requirements
In a case that has sent ripples through the data protection community, Estonia's Tartu District Court overturned an €85,000 fine imposed by the Estonian Data Protection Authority against genetic testing company Asper Biogene, concluding that the penalty cancellation was justified despite serious data breaches. While the data leak itself was severe—affecting approximately 10,000 people whose genetic and health data, including paternity tests, fertility tests, and genetic conditions information, was illegally downloaded—what makes this case particularly intriguing is the Authority's focus on a seemingly technical violation: the company's Data Protection Officer (DPO) lacked the independence required under GDPR Article 38(3).
The Case: A €85,000 Fine Overturned
The Estonian Data Protection Authority had fined Asper Biogene for two critical violations. First, the company appointed its sole board member as the DPO, who lacked both the necessary independence and competence for the role. Second, the Authority found that Asper Biogene had not implemented sufficient security measures, which led to the cyberattack in autumn 2023 that gave external parties access to the company's database, including special category personal data.
The District Court agreed that appointing the DPO constituted a violation, emphasizing that a board member who manages the company's activities and determines the purposes and means of data processing cannot simultaneously independently fulfill the duties of a DPO. However, the court found that the violation was committed through negligence and took into account that the company later appointed a competent specialist and implemented additional security measures. The court terminated the misdemeanor proceedings based on expediency considerations, finding that the guilt was minor and there was no public interest in prosecution.
The Supreme Court of Estonia ultimately decided in August 2025 not to hear the Data Protection Authority's cassation appeal, effectively ending the legal proceedings.
The Law vs. Reality: GDPR's Independence Paradox
The legal requirements are crystal clear. Article 38(3) of GDPR states that "the controller and processor shall ensure that the data protection officer does not receive any instructions regarding the exercise of those tasks" and "shall directly report to the highest management level of the controller or the processor". Additionally, Article 38(6) emphasizes that while the DPO may fulfill other tasks and duties, these should not result in a conflict of interests, with guidance stating that the DPO may not hold positions which result in determining the purposes and means of processing.
European regulators have been increasingly strict about this requirement. Data protection authorities across the European Union have increasingly imposed fines on organizations for appointing DPOs with conflicts of interest, including cases where Italian authorities fined a public body €6,000 for appointing a DPO who held multiple key positions. The Belgian Data Protection Authority issued a €50,000 fine to an organization for appointing the head of compliance, audit and risk management as DPO, arguing that combining these roles creates a conflict of interest.
But here's where theory meets an uncomfortable reality: the independence requirement, while legally mandated, may be practically meaningless given the actual role and powers of a DPO under GDPR.
The Fundamental Contradiction
The GDPR creates a curious contradiction in the DPO role. On one hand, it demands fierce independence—no instructions, direct reporting to top management, protection from dismissal. On the other hand, it provides the DPO with virtually no actual authority to enforce compliance.
Under Articles 38 and 39, the DPO has six major tasks: monitoring compliance, advising the organization, serving as a contact point for supervisory authorities, conducting training, performing data protection impact assessments, and receiving comments from data subjects. Notably absent from this list is any enforcement power.
The DPO is fundamentally:
- An internal advisor with no power to compel action
- A liaison between the organization and data subjects/authorities
- A monitor who observes but cannot directly intervene
As regulatory guidance emphasizes, "All decisions regarding the data processing must be taken by the data controller with the advice of the DPO". The controller—not the DPO—remains fully responsible for all data processing decisions and GDPR compliance.
Why Independence Becomes Irrelevant
This structure renders the independence requirement practically pointless for several reasons:
1. No Decision-Making Authority
Since the DPO cannot make binding decisions about data processing, their independence from management structures doesn't change the fundamental power dynamics. Whether independent or not, they can only advise—the controller decides.
2. Full Controller Liability
The controller remains responsible for all GDPR compliance regardless of DPO advice. If the controller ignores DPO recommendations, the controller—not the DPO—faces regulatory sanctions. Independence doesn't shift this liability.
3. Resource Dependency
Even an "independent" DPO depends entirely on the controller for resources, access to information, and organizational cooperation. The GDPR requires controllers to provide "adequate resources (sufficient time, financial, infrastructure, and, where appropriate, staff) to enable the DPO to meet their obligations". True independence is impossible when you depend on the very entity you're supposed to independently monitor.
4. Information Asymmetry
The DPO's effectiveness depends on complete information about organizational data processing activities. Controllers maintain full control over what information the DPO receives and when. Independence means little if the controller can simply withhold relevant information.
What Really Matters: Expertise Over Independence
The Asper Biogene case inadvertently highlights what should be the real focus: competence rather than independence. The court noted that the board member serving as DPO lacked both "the necessary independence and competence for the role", but from a practical standpoint, the competence deficit was likely far more damaging than the independence issue.
Article 37(5) requires that "the data protection officer shall be designated on the basis of professional qualities and, in particular, expert knowledge of data protection law and practices and the ability to fulfil the tasks referred to in Article 39". This expertise requirement is what enables a DPO to provide valuable guidance, regardless of their organizational position.
A competent DPO who understands both legal requirements and business operations can:
- Identify privacy risks early in project development
- Design practical compliance solutions
- Provide credible advice that management trusts
- Build effective privacy programs
The Small Business Reality
The independence requirement becomes particularly absurd for smaller organizations. SMEs often operate at full capacity, making hiring a full-time dedicated DPO unreasonable. Forcing these companies to choose between artificial independence and practical competence often results in neither.
Consider a small genetic testing company like Asper Biogene. The board member serving as DPO likely had the deepest understanding of the company's data processing activities, business model, and operational constraints—exactly the knowledge needed to provide effective privacy guidance. Requiring a separate, "independent" person with less institutional knowledge may actually reduce the quality of privacy oversight.
A More Pragmatic Approach
Rather than focusing on formal independence, regulations should emphasize:
Competence Requirements
Detailed standards for DPO expertise, including both legal knowledge and practical experience with similar data processing operations.
Transparency Obligations
Clear requirements for DPOs to document their advice and recommendations, creating an auditable record of privacy guidance.
Accountability Mechanisms
Systems ensuring that controllers must formally respond to DPO recommendations, either implementing them or documenting why they're rejected.
Resource Guarantees
Specific minimum resource allocations ensuring DPOs can perform their advisory functions effectively.
Regulatory Overreach or Necessary Protection?
Critics might argue that independence requirements serve important symbolic functions—signaling the importance of privacy, creating cultural separation between compliance and business functions, and providing psychological protection for individuals raising privacy concerns.
However, as one analysis noted, "while empowering the Data Protection Officer is paramount in demonstrating high ethical standards, organizations are ultimately responsible for signing off on decisions". The accountability ultimately rests with the controller, not the DPO.
The Estonian Court's Wisdom
The Tartu District Court's decision to terminate proceedings based on "expediency considerations" and finding that "guilt was minor" suggests a pragmatic recognition that formal independence violations may not warrant severe punishment when substantive harm is limited and remediation has occurred.
The Estonian Data Protection Authority maintains that "DPO independence is not merely a formal requirement and this role cannot be fulfilled by a person who simultaneously manages the organization", but the court's decision implies a more nuanced view of proportionality in enforcement.
Conclusion: Time for Regulatory Evolution
The Asper Biogene case exposes a fundamental tension in GDPR's DPO framework: rigid independence requirements that may undermine the practical effectiveness of privacy oversight. While the regulation's intent—ensuring objective privacy guidance—is admirable, the execution creates bureaucratic obstacles that may not serve the ultimate goal of protecting personal data.
As the GDPR approaches its seventh year of implementation, regulators should consider whether formal independence requirements are the best way to achieve effective privacy governance, or whether a focus on competence, transparency, and accountability might better serve both organizations and data subjects.
The genetic data of 10,000 Estonian individuals was compromised not because their DPO lacked independence, but because of inadequate security measures and cybercriminal attacks. Perhaps it's time to focus regulatory attention where it can make the biggest difference: on the substantive protection of personal data rather than the organizational charts of those tasked with guiding that protection.
The Asper Biogene case demonstrates that sometimes the most legally clear requirements may be practically irrelevant. As data protection law matures, distinguishing between form and substance becomes increasingly important for effective privacy governance.
