

A Framework for Evaluating Emerging Cyberattack Capabilities of AI

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As frontier models become more capable, the community has attempted to evaluate their ability to enable cyberattacks. Performing a comprehensive evaluation and prioritizing defenses are crucial tasks in preparing for AGI safely. However, current cyber evaluation efforts are ad-hoc, with no systematic reasoning about the various phases of attacks, and do not provide a steer on how to use targeted defenses. In this work, we propose a novel approach to AI cyber capability evaluation that (1) examines the end-to-end attack chain, (2) helps to identify gaps in the evaluation of AI threats, and (3) helps defenders prioritize targeted mitigations and conduct AI-enabled adversary emulation to support red teaming. To achieve these goals, we propose adapting existing cyberattack chain frameworks to AI systems. We analyze over 12,000 instances of real-world attempts to use AI in cyberattacks catalogued by Google’s Threat Intelligence Group. Using this analysis, we curate a representative collection of seven cyberattack chain archetypes and conduct a bottleneck analysis to identify areas of potential AI-driven cost disruption. Our evaluation benchmark consists of 50 new challenges spanning different phases of cyberattacks. Based on this, we devise targeted cybersecurity model evaluations, report on the potential for AI to amplify offensive cyber capabilities across specific attack phases, and conclude with recommendations on prioritizing defenses. In all, we consider this to be the most comprehensive AI cyber risk evaluation framework published so far.

Keywords: Frontier AI Safety, Cybersecurity Evaluations

1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) offers tremendous global opportunities that have the potential to dramatically improve human well-being. Within the field of cybersecurity, AI has long been essential for defensive operations. Recent AI advances have ushered in a new generation of defensive applications, such as identifying vulnerabilities in codebases (Li et al., 2018, 2021; Lu et al., 2024), understanding their overall security posture in plain language, summarizing incidents (Ban et al., 2023), facilitate rapid incident response (Hays and White, 2024), and performing a variety of tasks fundamental to modern cybersecurity best practices (Du et al., 2024; Ruan et al., 2024).

However, as with any emerging technology, such practical benefits do not come without risk. For example, at Google DeepMind we are exploring risks and mitigations at the “frontier” of AI,

which encompasses dangerous capabilities that match or exceed the capabilities of today’s most advanced systems (Shevlane et al., 2023). Both model developers and government organizations like the UK’s AI Security Institute (formerly the AI Safety Institute) (InfoSecurity Magazine, 2025)) have recognized the importance of focusing on AI security risks and managing these risks. Frontier AI cyber-capabilities can pose a number of risks:

- **Capability Uplift:** Boosting cyber skills and enabling more actors to launch sophisticated attacks.
- **Throughput Uplift:** Expanding the scale and accelerating the speed of attacks.
- **Novel Risks from Autonomous Systems:** Creating new risks through automated reconnaissance, social engineering, and autonomous cyber agents, increasing attack effectiveness and discretion.

These risks are outlined in Google’s Secure




Figure 1 | The Cyberattack Chain is a cybersecurity framework that outlines the stages of a typical cyberattack and provides a structured approach to dealing with cyber threats, making it easier to analyze attacks, to prioritize, and to develop defenses.

AI Framework (SAIF) risk taxonomy (Google, 2025a) and there is recent evidence that AI is already being used to enhance cyberattacks and other forms of cyber misuse. See, for example, the recent Google Threat Intelligence Group report on the misuse of generative AI (Google, 2025b). As models progress towards AGI, they theoretically become capable of autonomously discovering a large number of vulnerabilities and also of fixing and securing code. This framework should offer a general way to reason about emerging cyber risk, and to importantly offer guidance on where to target defenses as well as which ones to prioritize. This comprehensive evaluation approach is important for augmenting AI safety. In response to these emerging risks, AI labs have performed safety evaluations (Anthropic, 2025; Bhatt et al., 2024; Derczynski et al., 2024; Jaech et al., 2024; Shao et al., 2024; Wan et al., 2024). These safety evaluations tend to include specific types of assessments, such as Capture-the-Flag (Bhatt et al., 2023) evaluations, or knowledge benchmarks to assess model knowledge on a particular topic (Kouremetis et al., 2025; Tihanyi et al., 2024). However, these evaluations do not systematically consider all the phases of a cyberattack, therefore potentially overlooking relevant attack factors, and do not offer a systematic translation into relevant insights for cybersecurity defenders.

The framework. In this paper, we propose a new evaluation framework that leverages established and widely adopted structured cybersecurity frameworks, such as the Cyberattack Chain (Lockheed Martin, 2025) and the MITRE ATT&CK framework (Strom et al., 2018) to evaluate the cyber capabilities of AI. As we elaborate in Section 2 and depicted in Figure 2, this approach:

- evaluates systematically AI cyberattack capabilities over the end-to-end phases of an attack chain as illustrated in Figure 1,
- informs AI-enabled adversary emulation,
- helps assess gaps in the evaluation of AI threats, and
- offers insights for defenders about where to target defenses and which ones to prioritize.

The benchmark. We begin by analyzing over 12,000 instances of real-world attempts to use AI in cyberattacks from more than 20 countries that were catalogued by Google’s Threat Intelligence Group. Grounded in this analysis, we curated a representative collection of 7 cyberattack chain archetypes and conducted a bottleneck analysis to identify specific phases where AI-driven cost disruptions are most likely.

Leveraging this “basket” of attack chains, we worked with external stakeholders and organizations to develop a new AI cyber capability benchmark that consists of 50 challenges across the




Figure 2 | Mapping the potential AI-enabled cost reduction to specific phases of attack progression to provide decision-relevant insights to defenders.

cyberattack chain, covering areas such as intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, operational security, vulnerability exploitation, and malware development. Our cyber challenges are new, not based on publicly available challenges and therefore do not risk benchmark contamination.

To the best of our knowledge, our benchmark features the most comprehensive coverage of offensive cyber capabilities across the entirety of the cyberattack chain.

Results and learnings. Section 6 discusses our evaluation results on Gemini 2.0 Flash experimental. The model solved 12 out of 50 unique challenges of varying difficulty levels (2/2 Strawman, 6/8 Easy, 4/28 Medium, 0/12 Hard). The evaluated model had an overall success rate of 16% (209/1270 evaluations). Overall, we interpret that the model still lacks the skills necessary for real-world operations, and is therefore incapable of either carrying out end-to-end attacks or significantly assisting with high impact cyberattacks. Based on the observed instances of attempted use of AI in cyberattacks and the results of our evaluations we find that rather than enabling disruptive change, current frontier AI capabilities allow threat actors greater speed, scale, and throughput.

Our benchmark revealed that current AI cyber evaluations often overlook critical areas. While much attention is given to AI-enabled vulnerability exploitation and novel exploit development,

our analysis highlights the significant potential for AI models to contribute to under-researched phases like evasion, detection avoidance, obfuscation, and persistence. Specifically, AI’s ability to enhance these stages presents a substantial, yet often underestimated, threat. Furthermore, while not strictly overlooked by prior work, we also confirmed the importance of measuring and mitigating the potential misuse of capabilities like: the ability for models to perform reconnaissance in a network environment, exploit vulnerabilities across multiple networked machines, and orchestrate long-horizon cyber attacks in a vulnerable network.

The path to AGI security. As frontier models improve towards artificial general intelligence (AGI), their cyber attack capabilities will evolve significantly. We anticipate AI to alter the cost of attack phases, prompting adversaries to adapt and innovate. We designed our evaluation strategy to be general enough to capture this evolving landscape, and to act as a resource for defenders. By continually updating representative attack chains, the bottleneck analysis and the AI-enabled uplift evaluations within this framework, we can maintain an advantage in the face of AI-enabled adversaries, and help to equip defenders with insights that strengthen their security posture.

2. Background

The cybersecurity field has long recognized the importance of structured approaches in understanding and effectively defending against the ever-evolving landscape of cyberattacks. In the face of sophisticated and often obfuscated adversary actions, a structured lens provides clarity, facilitates communication, and enables strategic resource allocation. Two concepts that have profoundly revolutionized cyber defense strategies and exemplified the power of structured thinking are the Cyberattack Chain (Lockheed Martin, 2025) and the MITRE ATT&CK framework (Strom et al., 2018), which we now describe.

2.1. Cyberattack Chain

The Cyberattack Chain (Lockheed Martin, 2025) provides a seven-stage model that outlines the typical progression of a cyberattack. These stages are: Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control (C2), and Actions on Objectives, as illustrated in Figure 1). This structured depiction of attack progression offers several critical advantages for defenders. Firstly, it provides a common language for discussing and analyzing attack campaigns, facilitating clear communication between security teams, incident responders, and leadership. Secondly, it allows defenders to strategically understand where to intervene in an attack sequence. By understanding the discrete stages, defenders can identify critical control points and deploy targeted defenses and move beyond reacting to attacks and adopt a proactive, layered defense strategy by anticipating attack progression and strategically allocating resources across different stages.

2.2. MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Complementing the Cyberattack Chain, the MITRE ATT&CK framework (Strom et al., 2018) provides a comprehensive and living knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. ATT&CK is structured as a matrix, organizing adversary behavior into tactics (the high-level goals an adversary

wants to achieve during an attack, like “Initial Access”, “Lateral Movement”, or “Exfiltration”) and techniques (specific methods adversaries use to achieve those tactics, such as “Spearphishing Attachment” or “Pass the Hash”). The framework’s value lies in its ability to characterize adversary behavior patterns in a structured and granular manner. By mapping observed attacker actions to ATT&CK techniques, organizations can gain a deeper understanding of how attacks are carried out, not just the overall stages. This detailed understanding enables defenders to develop targeted defenses that address specific adversary techniques.

3. The case for a structured cyberattack chain evaluation of AI

In environments characterized by limited resources and an overwhelming volume of potential threats, structured frameworks like the Cyberattack Chain and MITRE ATT&CK are not merely conceptual models, but crucial tools for resource prioritization. Without a structured understanding of how real-world attacks unfold and the specific techniques employed, organizations struggle to effectively allocate their security investments. By leveraging these frameworks, organizations can strategically deploy limited resources to enhance their overall security posture, moving from reactive firefighting to proactive, risk-informed defense.

3.1. Frontier Safety Evaluations: Measuring AI Cyber Skills

In response to these emerging risks and opportunities, organizations are increasingly adopting the practice of developing and running safety evaluations to assess the potential implications of these advanced models in specific domains, including in cybersecurity (Anthropic, 2025; Jaech et al., 2024; Wan et al., 2024).

Safety evaluations in the cyber domain typically involve measuring the performance of AI models across specific cyber skills, often in the form of a wide range of benchmarks and challenges that include:




Figure 3 | Frontier AI safety evaluations reveal cyber capabilities, but it is unclear how to translate these findings into practical cybersecurity defense strategies.

- **CTF-style Exercise:** Typically Jeopardy style CTFs measure the ability to successfully execute a specific task or short series of tasks in an isolated environment (Bhatt et al., 2023, 2024; Wan et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2023b)
- **Knowledge Benchmark:** Tests designed to assess the kinds, and extent of, model knowledge on a particular topic. Typically use QA style questions or prompt exercises (Kouremetis et al., 2025)
- **Uplift Study:** Measures the potential impact on threat actors by assessing how much AI improves a user's task performance (Wan et al., 2024)
- **Cyber Range Exercise:** A simulated, controlled, and realistic environment which is more elaborate than an individual CTF. This can include designing agent-like systems with reasoning and planning capabilities which allows models in an environment to iteratively learn
- **Forecasting Study:** forecasts on the operational impact of an AI model, with predicted measures for operational cost reduction, frequency of attempted and successful attacks, etc (Phuong et al., 2024)

These evaluations provide valuable empirical data on the raw cyber capabilities of AI models, demonstrating their proficiency in tasks like exploiting vulnerabilities, crafting exploits, or solving cryptographic puzzles. The results of these evaluations, often reported as scores on specific CTF

challenges or metrics like challenge success rate, serve as indicators of the potential risks and opportunities associated with advanced AI in cybersecurity (Figure 3).

3.2. The Limitation

While frontier safety evaluations provide crucial insights into the cyber capabilities of advanced AI models, a significant translation gap persists. It remains unclear how to effectively translate the findings of these evaluations into insights that can illuminate where to prioritize the deployment of mitigation strategies for cybersecurity defenders in real-world scenarios. A model's high score on a reverse engineering CTF challenge, while indicative of a powerful capability, does not inherently prescribe specific defensive actions. Does it mean organizations need to invest more in anti-reverse engineering technologies? Should incident response protocols be updated? Or is the risk contained to a specific niche scenario? Current, commonly-used evaluations, while valuable for measuring specific cyber capabilities, often lack the context and guidance needed to inform defenses by understanding how the cost to execute certain attack patterns will be impacted because of AI capabilities. This gap between identifying risks through evaluations and empowering defenders with insights into how specific aspects of adversary behaviors in cyberattacks will be impacted by emerging AI capabilities is the central challenge this paper seeks to address.

3.3. The Cost Collapse Argument

To help address the gap between frontier AI evaluations and an understanding of how capabilities could alter cyberattack chains, it is important to consider the potential for advanced AI capabilities to fundamentally alter the economics of cyberattacks.

We argue that the primary risk posed by frontier AI in the cyber domain is the potential to dramatically change the costs associated with stages of the cyberattack chain for stages that have historically been expensive, time-consuming, or even insurmountable for less sophisticated actors.

Traditionally, conducting advanced cyberattacks has required significant investments in time, expertise, specialized tools, and infrastructure. Stages like vulnerability research, exploit development, and sophisticated social engineering have acted as natural barriers, limiting the scale and sophistication of attacks to well-resourced and highly skilled actors.

However, the increasing capabilities of frontier AI models threaten to dismantle these barriers. By automating complex tasks previously requiring human ingenuity and extensive effort, AI models can significantly lower the barriers to entry for malicious actors of all attack levels. Take, for example, the traditional cost associated with discovering a zero-day vulnerability. This process can involve months of highly specialized research by expert security analysts (Ablon and Bogart, 2017). If AI models can automate significant portions of the vulnerability research process, the “cost” in terms of time and expert labor dramatically decreases. Similarly, AI-powered tools could automate the creation of highly targeted and convincing phishing campaigns, changing the “cost” in terms of attacker effort and increasing the likelihood of successful initial access.

To better quantify and track this potential sudden change in cost to execute a phase of a cyberattack and illuminate defensive strategies, we propose an analogy to the way inflation is measured in economics. We propose the use of an evolving representative “basket of cyber goods” that embodies typical attack patterns and workflows based on real-world threat intelligence.

By systematically measuring the potential AI-driven cost transformations across each stage of the cyberattack chain and for various attack patterns, we can develop a robust framework for evaluating the risk posed by specific AI models. This approach moves beyond simply assessing capabilities, enabling us to 1) identify specific areas across the attack chain that will see an out-sized benefit due to development in AI capabilities and 2) understand when evaluation results suggest an AI system will meaningfully affect the cost and therefore potentially the incidence of an attack pattern. This understanding is essential for developing proactive mitigation strategies, guiding

responsible AI development within the cyber domain, and ensuring that defensive advancements can keep pace with the evolving threat landscape.

4. The Evaluation Framework

We adopt a systematic mapping process designed to translate the abstract findings of AI evaluations across a representative set of current and expected cyberattack patterns into insights that help prioritize specific phases of attack patterns that should be considered as priorities when it comes to the development of defensive strategies. Our mapping methodology consists of four distinct, yet interconnected stages, each building upon the previous to provide a progressively refined understanding of AI-driven cyber risks and corresponding mitigations (Figure 4).

4.1. Stage 1: Curating a Basket of Representative Attack Chains

The foundation of our mapping process lies in establishing a comprehensive “basket” of representative cyberattack attack chains. This basket is not a static entity but rather a dynamic and evolving collection of attack patterns that reflect both known, historically prevalent attack methodologies and anticipated future trends.

To construct this basket, we draw upon over 12,000 instances of real-world attempts to use AI in cyberattacks and a large high-fidelity dataset of cyber incidents cataloged by Google’s Threat Intelligence Group. The goal of this curation is to capture the breadth and depth of the contemporary threat landscape. This includes representing a variety of attack vectors (e.g., phishing, supply chain attacks, ransomware), target environments (e.g., cloud infrastructure, IoT devices, critical infrastructure), and adversary motivations (e.g., financial gain, espionage, disruption). By compiling this basket, we ensure that our subsequent analysis and evaluation efforts are grounded in the reality of how cyberattacks unfold in practice, rather than focusing on isolated or hypothetical scenarios. This basket serves as our representative sample of the attack landscape, ensuring the relevance and applicability of our findings.




Figure 4 | Overview of our approach.

Prioritisation. We choose to define our threat model and curate patterns of attack to incorporate in our benchmark by taking into account a range of threat actors, goals and capabilities across these representative attack chains (Figure 6). We identified the set of general attack chains to monitor (Figure 8), and a subset of highest-priority representative attack chains based on their estimated impact and likelihood of their expected harm. Specifically, we identified and focused on high-impact threat scenarios and based likelihood on Google’s Threat Intelligence Group’s analysis of AI-enabled cyberattacks associated with known APT actors from more than 20 countries (Figure 5).

4.2. Stage 2: Bottleneck Analysis Across Representative Attack Chains

With a comprehensive basket of representative attack chains established (see Appendix), the next stage involves a detailed “bottleneck analysis”. Within this framework, a key bottleneck is a stage where the attacker faces significant hurdles, making progress to the next stage difficult and increasing the defender’s opportunity to disrupt the attack. Understanding bottlenecks helps illuminate where AI can have the most disruptive impact on the offensive cyber landscape. By focussing our evaluations on these key bottlenecks across cyberattack chains we can help organizations prioritize their limited security resources. Instead of trying to defend everywhere equally (which is often impossible), they can focus on strengthening defenses at these critical bottleneck stages where there is evidence supporting the potential

for a sudden change in the cost to execute specific phases of an attack as a result of advances in AI capabilities. Furthermore, this focus ensures our measurements are aimed at detecting increases in capability that have a meaningful effect on the likelihood of attacks.

We propose an approach where defenders consider each attack chain stage within our basket, considering the traditional costs associated with successful execution by human threat actors. These costs are multi-dimensional, encompassing:

- **Time:** The duration required to complete a particular stage, impacting the overall speed and scale of an attack.
- **Effort:** The level of human labor, both skilled and unskilled, required, reflecting the attacker’s resource investment.
- **Knowledge Required:** The depth of specialized expertise and domain-specific knowledge necessary, acting as a barrier to entry for less sophisticated actors.
- **Ability to Scale an Attack:** The inherent limitations in replicating and expanding the attack across multiple targets or environments, reflecting operational constraints.

We propose to then assess the potential for frontier AI to drastically reduce these costs. This assessment leverages our understanding of AI capabilities demonstrated in safety evaluations and considers how these capabilities could automate, accelerate, or simplify traditionally complex tasks. By systematically identifying these

Attack Chain Phase	Real-world instances of misuse of AI
Reconnaissance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research publicly reported vulnerabilities and specific CVEs • Recon on international defense organizations • Research target infrastructure • Understand public database of target organization personnel • Research on specific CVEs and technologies • Research on server-side request forgery exploitation techniques • Reverse engineering the endpoint detection
Weaponization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Add malware encryption functionality to existing code • Generate fake company profiles • Assist with malicious scripting • Brainstorm ideas for a PR campaign and accompanying visual designs
Delivery, Exploitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create more persuasive BEC messages • Help augment business email compromise (BEC) operations • Research advanced techniques for phishing Gmail • Research vulnerabilities in the WinRM protocol • Reverse engineer endpoint detection and response • Access Microsoft Exchange using a password hash • Router exploitation
Installation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sign an Outlook VSTO plug-in • Deploy Outlook VSTO plug-in silently • Add a self-signed certificate to Active Directory • Exploit chrome extensions that provide parental controls and monitoring
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate code to remotely access Windows Event Log • Obtain Active Directory management commands • JSON Web Token (JWT) security and routing rules in Ruby on Rails • Character encoding issues in smbclient • Command to check IPs of admins on the domain controller
Actions on Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify sensitive documents within large data stores • Automate workflows with Selenium (e.g., logging into compromised account) • Automate data exfil from compromised Gmail accounts.

Figure 5 | Observed instances of use of AI across the various phases of the attack chain.




Figure 6 | Impact/likelihood analysis.

bottleneck stages (Appendix A) across our basket of attack chains, we pinpoint the critical phases in the attack lifecycle that are most amenable to benefiting from AI.

4.3. Stage 3: Devising Targeted Cybersecurity Model Evaluations

The bottleneck analysis directly informs the design of targeted cybersecurity model evaluations. For each bottleneck stage identified in the previous step, we devise specific evaluations that are purpose-built to measure an AI model’s ability to reduce the associated costs. These evaluations move beyond generic capability assessments and are designed to simulate the typical real-world conditions in which the targeted attack pattern unfolds. This involves several key considerations:




Figure 7 | Prevalence of observed AI-enabled techniques within the reconnaissance phase of attack. Real-world instances of AI-enabled cyber campaigns help us ground our selection of representative attack chains, likelihood estimates and inform evaluation design.

- **Simulated Environments:** Evaluations are conducted within simulated environments that realistically represent the target systems, networks, and security controls relevant to the bottleneck stage. This might involve setting up virtual networks mimicking enterprise infrastructure, deploying realistic software vulnerabilities, or simulating user behaviors in social engineering scenarios.
- **Real-World Conditions:** Evaluations incorporate elements of real-world constraints and complexities. This could include introducing noisy data, limited information availability, or adversarial defenses that the AI model must overcome, mirroring the challenges faced by attackers in live operations.
- **Cost Reduction Metrics:** Crucially, evaluations are designed to generate metrics that directly quantify the degree to which an AI model reduces the cost associated with the targeted bottleneck phase. This could involve measuring metrics like:
 - **Time to Completion:** How quickly can the AI model or a human using the AI model complete a task in the bottleneck stage compared to a baseline (e.g., human performance, non-AI tools)?
 - **Success Rate:** How reliably can the AI model successfully execute the bottleneck stage task, reflecting reduced

effort and increased effectiveness?

- **Capability Level Required (Proxy Metrics):** By analyzing the resources and expertise needed to achieve successful outcomes with the AI model, we can infer a reduction in the knowledge barrier (e.g., measuring the complexity of prompts or configurations required).
- **Scalability Metrics:** Assessing the AI model’s ability to repeat the bottleneck stage task across multiple instances or targets, indicating increased attack scalability.

4.4. Stage 4: Evaluation Execution and Aggregated Cost Differential Scores

The final stage involves executing the targeted evaluations devised in Stage 3 to provide a comprehensive assessment of an AI model’s potential to induce a change in cost across the representative basket of attack chains. We systematically conduct each evaluation, collecting the cost reduction metrics defined in Stage 3. These metrics are then aggregated, potentially using weighted averages based on the prevalence or criticality of the corresponding attack chain or bottleneck stage, to generate an overall “cost differential score” for the evaluated AI model. This aggregated score offers a quantifiable measure of the model’s potential to amplify offensive cyber capabilities across a range of attack patterns. A higher cost differential score signifies a greater potential for the AI model to disrupt the existing economics of cyber-attack, highlighting areas where defenders must prioritize mitigation strategies.

By systematically progressing through these four stages, our mapping process transforms the abstract outputs of frontier AI safety evaluations into insights that can help defenders prioritize the deployment of targeted defences for specific phases of the attack chain. This structured approach allows us to not only identify potential AI-driven risks but also to contextualize them within established cybersecurity frameworks, enabling defenders to strategically prioritize resources and proactively enhance their security posture in the face of evolving AI-driven cyber threats.

5. Evaluation Benchmark

To ground our evaluation methodology in the realities of the contemporary and emerging cyber threat landscape, we initiated the process by curating a set of representative attack patterns.

We adopted a multi-faceted approach to data gathering, leveraging both expert insights and extensive open-source intelligence. Firstly, we consulted with cybersecurity experts from both industry and academia to solicit their perspectives on the most significant and representative attack patterns currently observed in cyber operations.

Complementing these expert consultations, we conducted a detailed review of publicly available reports and databases documenting significant cyber incidents. Our sources included:

- **Adversarial Misuses of Generative AI Dataset:** Google’s Threat Intelligence Group analyzed Gemini activity associated with known APT actors and identified APT groups from more than 20 countries that used Gemini ([Google, 2025b](#)). APT actors used Gemini to support several phases of the attack lifecycle, including researching potential infrastructure and free hosting providers, reconnaissance on target organizations, research into vulnerabilities, payload development, and assistance with malicious scripting and evasion techniques.
- **CSIS Significant Cyber Events:** We reviewed the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) database of significant cyber events ([Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025](#)). This resource provides a curated list of notable cyber incidents, offering a broad overview of impactful attacks across various sectors and motivations.
- **Mandiant Advantage Platform Threat Intelligence:** We leveraged threat intelligence data from [Mandiant \(2025\)](#). The platform provides detailed analyses of advanced persistent threats (APTs) and prevalent attack techniques observed in real-world breaches.
- **Security Company Public Write-ups:** We systematically examined public reports, blog posts, and analyses published by a wide

range of cybersecurity companies (e.g., CrowdStrike, Palo Alto Networks, FireEye, etc.) These resources often provide in-depth technical details on specific attacks, including attack chain breakdowns and adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

By synthesizing insights from these diverse sources, we aimed to build a “basket” that was not only technically grounded but also representative of the attacks that pose the most significant risks to organizations and society at large.

5.1. Selection Criteria: Prioritizing Impact and AI Relevance

From the wealth of data gathered, we applied a focused set of selection criteria to distill a manageable yet representative set of attack chains for our benchmark. The criteria were specifically designed to prioritize attack patterns that are both impactful in the real world and highly relevant to the emerging capabilities of frontier AI. The three key criteria guiding our selection were:

- **Prevalence in Real-World Cyber Incidents:** This criterion prioritized attack types that are frequently observed in real-world cyberattacks. We focused on attack vectors that consistently appear in incident reports and threat intelligence briefings, indicating their widespread use by threat actors.
- **Severity of the Attack:** Beyond frequency, we also considered the potential impact and severity of each attack type. Severity was evaluated based on the potential consequences of a successful attack, encompassing factors such as:
 - **Financial Losses:** Potential for direct financial theft, business disruption leading to revenue loss, and costs associated with incident response and recovery.
 - **Operational Disruption:** Impact on critical infrastructure, essential services, and organizational operations.
 - **Reputational Damage:** Harm to organizational reputation and customer trust.

– **Data Breach Sensitivity:** Potential compromise of sensitive personal data, intellectual property, or classified information. We prioritized attack types that demonstrably lead to significant real-world harm when successfully executed.

- **Likelihood to Significantly Benefit from Emerging AI Capabilities:** We prioritized attack types where we hypothesized that emerging AI capabilities, particularly frontier AI models, could offer a substantial “capability uplift” or “throughput uplift” to attackers. This assessment was informed by a dataset of 12,000 instances of attempted use of AI in cyber campaigns and our understanding of AI capabilities demonstrated in capability evaluations. We considered attack stages that historically have been bottlenecks due to their reliance on human ingenuity, time-intensive manual work, or specialized skills, and evaluated the potential for AI to automate or augment these stages, thereby significantly reducing the cost of execution for attackers.

By applying these three criteria in conjunction, we ensured that our evaluation benchmark would focus on attack patterns that are not only relevant today but also strategically important to understand in the context of advancing AI capabilities in the cyber domain.

5.2. Representative Attack Chains

Based on our data curation and selection criteria, we arrived at the following representative attack chains to form our evaluation benchmark. These attack types represent a range of prevalent and impactful threats, each with distinct characteristics and vulnerabilities that make them relevant for assessing the potential impact of frontier AI:

- **Phishing:** Consistently ranks as a top initial access vector in breach reports. Relies on social engineering, an area where AI-powered personalized and sophisticated phishing campaigns pose a significant future

Attack Type	Examples of Recent & Historical Incidents
Phishing	- LoanDepot Ransomware Attack (2024) - Pepco Social Engineering Attack (2024) Democratic National Committee email leak (2016)
Malware	-Black Basta (2024) WannaCry ransomware attack (2017) - NotPetya cyberattack (2017)
Denial-of-Service (DoS)	- Hyper-volumetric attacks on Cloudflare (2024) Dyn cyberattack (2016) - GitHub DDoS attack (2018)
Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)	- GuptiMiner by the Kimsuky group (2024) Superfish adware (2015) - KRACK Wi-Fi vulnerability (2017)
SQL Injection	- GambleForce Attack (2024) Heartland Payment Systems data breach (2008) - TalkTalk data breach (2015)
Zero-Day Attack	- Fortinet FortiGate (2024) Stuxnet (2010) - Sony Pictures hack (2014)

Figure 8 | Attack chain archetypes.

threat. Examples like the DNC leak and Facebook breach demonstrate the high impact of successful phishing attacks, ranging from political disruption to massive data exfiltration.

- **Malware:** Encompasses a broad category of threats including ransomware, trojans, and worms. Malware attacks are pervasive and can cause significant operational disruption and financial damage, as highlighted by WannaCry and NotPetya. AI advancements in polymorphic malware generation and evasion techniques make this a critical area to evaluate in the context of AI.
- **Denial-of-Service (DoS):** While often less impactful in terms of data breaches, DoS attacks can cause significant disruption of services and availability, as seen in the Dyn and GitHub attacks. AI-driven automation and amplification techniques could significantly lower the barrier to launching large-scale and sophisticated DDoS attacks.
- **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM):** Represents attacks that intercept and potentially manipulate communication. MitM attacks can compromise confidentiality and integrity, as illustrated by Superfish and KRACK vulnerability exploits. AI could enhance MitM attacks by automating traffic analysis and manipulation, making them more stealthy and effective.
- **SQL Injection:** A classic web application vulnerability that remains highly prevalent.

Successful SQL injection can lead to significant data breaches, as exemplified by the Heartland Payment Systems and TalkTalk breaches. AI could assist in automating the discovery and exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities, even in complex applications.

- **Zero-Day Attack:** Represents the most sophisticated type of attack exploiting previously unknown vulnerabilities. Zero-day attacks, like Stuxnet and the Sony Pictures hack, are often associated with advanced adversaries and can have severe consequences.

This set of representative attack chains serves as the foundation for our evaluation benchmark. In the subsequent sections, we will detail how we apply the bottleneck analysis and targeted evaluation methodologies to this benchmark, enabling us to quantify the potential for frontier AI to induce a sudden change in the cost to execute a phase of an attack and inform the prioritization of targeted defences across the cyberattack chain.

5.3. Evaluation Benchmark

Having systematically identified key bottleneck stages across our basket of representative attack chains (Appendix A), we proceeded to design a set of evaluations specifically targeted at measuring an AI model's capacity to overcome these critical impediments to attack progression. Recognizing the inherent risk of models overfitting to publicly accessible datasets and potentially skewing results, we deliberately chose to forgo reliance on existing public cyber evaluations. Instead, our evaluations were meticulously crafted based on cybersecurity "first principles" – focusing on fundamental security concepts and attack methodologies rather than mimicking specific challenges from existing cyber competitions or publicly available challenges, which might inadvertently be present within a model's training data.

To ensure a comprehensive and nuanced assessment, we partnered with external organizations to develop 50 bespoke challenge evaluations. These evaluations were designed to test a diverse range of cybersecurity capabilities directly relevant to surpassing the identified bottlenecks, encompassing a spectrum of difficulty

levels from basic to highly advanced. Specifically, these evaluations were categorized into the following challenge types, each designed to isolate and measure distinct offensive cyber capabilities:

- **Vulnerability Detection and Exploitation (V&E) Challenges:** These challenges require the model to autonomously identify and successfully exploit pre-existing security vulnerabilities. To ensure focused evaluation, the scope of each V&E challenge was deliberately constrained to a single instance – a specific service, machine, protocol, or application. This narrow scope allows for precise measurement of AI systems' core vulnerability exploitation abilities in isolation, minimizing the influence of extraneous factors such as contextual understanding or the discovery of alternative, non-exploit-based solutions (like credential theft for unauthorized access).
- **Evasion Challenges:** These challenges assess the model's ability to execute a defined cyber operation while actively evading detection by contemporary monitoring and defense systems, such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Evasion challenges are critical for evaluating a model's proficiency in conducting stealthy cyber operations, a capability paramount to the success of many real-world offensive campaigns.
- **Network Attack Simulation Challenges:** In contrast to the focused scope of V&E and Evasion challenges, Network Attack Simulation challenges require the model to achieve a broader objective within a simulated network environment of multiple interconnected devices and services. These evaluations are specifically designed to assess a model's comprehensive cybersecurity situational awareness. This includes evaluating its ability to: analyze complex, dynamic environments; formulate strategic action plans; and adapt its behavior in response to evolving circumstances and defensive countermeasures within the simulation. Success in these challenges typically necessitates the integrated application of multiple cybersecurity skills, including reconnaissance, custom

Reconnaissance	Weaponization	Delivery	Exploitation	Installation	Command and Control	Actions on Objectives
Active Scanning	Content Injection	Cross-site scripting	Crypto vulnerability	Exploitation of Remote Services	Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration
Gather Victim Host Information	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Man-in-the-Middle	Side-channel attack	Domain controller	Content Injection	Exfiltration Over Web Service
Web Exploration	Valid accounts	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Package vulnerability	Web Service	Protocol Tunneling	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Network recon	Vulnerability in OpenSSL	Create or Modify System Process	Weak Randomness		Tunnel over network node	Encrypt and exfiltrate
discover network credentials			HTTP header attack			
			SQL injection			
			Kerberoasting			
			Memory exploitation			

Figure 9 | A set of 32 representative samples of our evaluations. The remainder 18 evaluations are variants of these samples. We aimed for a breadth of coverage across the different stages of the cyberattack chain.

malicious code development or adaptation, and the skillful manipulation of existing network services to achieve a larger objective.

6. Evaluation

Evaluations are formulated as Capture the Flag challenges (CTFs), which use cyber expertise to find a ‘flag’ (usually a random string) hidden in a target system. This task format is versatile, and allows for the customisation of various cyber skills and difficulty levels, including complex multi-step processes. For each challenge, we provided:

- An attacker goal
- Details of the challenge environment
- Instructions on how to use external tools (in this case, the model was given a shell execution tool)

Scoring Across our evaluation set we calculate the percentage of successful attempts for evaluations at each difficulty level across different clusters of evaluations that capture bottlenecks identified in the process. These calculated success rates capture how the system’s performance varies across difficulty thresholds within bottle-

neck skills and capabilities identified within the representative basket of cyberattack patterns.

The model had a limited number of interactions with the environment (30) to try and solve the challenge, with each interaction limited to one shell command execution. A success was counted when the “flag” (a challenge-specific unguessable string, hidden somewhere in the environment depending on the challenge) appeared anywhere in the shell command, its output, or the output from the model.

Each evaluation in our benchmark evaluates at least one cyber capability deemed to be a critical bottleneck within the basket of representative attack chains. A ‘task difficulty level’ is assigned for each cyber capability assessed and indicates the expected attack level needed to solve the task in that area. The task difficulty levels have been assigned to tasks based on expert judgement and calibration with the difficulty levels of public tasks.

Challenges were further divided into four difficulty levels:

- Strawman challenges are straightforward tasks designed to ensure the model can follow simple orders.




Figure 10 | Overview of model configuration.

- Easy challenges require exploitation of common vulnerabilities in a previously unused, but not particularly well-hidden context. They are expected to be solvable by cybersecurity practitioners with limited experience.
- Medium challenges require a number of steps to solve, for example the combined exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities.
- Hard challenges require combining multiple insights of different types and a nontrivial implementation. They can be challenging even for experienced cybersecurity practitioners

Model configuration. We focused our evaluations on Gemini 2.0 Flash experimental. The model was provided with scaffolding to form an agent. The scaffolding consists of a set of tools, a prompting procedure and error handling to help the agent troubleshoot issues that arise from tool-calling. Default hyper-parameter values were used for models during evaluation.

The step-by-step workflow of how each experiment works is as follows:

1. Controller retrieves user-provided descriptions and instructions for each cyber challenge and provide them to the model
2. Model produces an execution based on the given challenge description and instructions
3. (Optional): if there is a tool call in the model output, controller involves the tool and gets the results
4. Controller then forwards the execution com-

mand and tool call results to the Environment

5. Environment executes the command and returns its result to Controller
6. If the challenge is solved, then Controller stops; otherwise, Controller feeds back the execution result and history to the model and repeats Step 2 above.

6.1. Results

Figure 12 depicts the evaluation results grouped by a bottleneck skills and phases of the cyberattack chain. The evaluated model solved 12 out of 50 unique challenges of varying difficulty levels (2/2 Strawman, 6/8 Easy, 4/28 Medium, 0/12 Hard). The evaluated model had an overall success rate of 16% (209/1270 evaluations).

When evaluating the capabilities of the model across specific clusters of cyber skills deemed to be bottlenecks we found:

- The model was able to successfully solve 40% of the challenges that target operational security skills. This includes discovery evasion, attribution and forensic evasion and adaptation of operations based on target specific security measures. One reason for why the success rate for this particular bottleneck attack was higher than others was because tasks within this domain do not typically require a long sequence of syntactically perfect model actions (see analysis of failure mode patterns).
- The model was only able to successfully solve 6.25% of the challenges that targeted vulnerability exploitation. This included the ability to develop working exploits for vulnerabilities, including handling security mitigations. The main failure mode seen in these evaluations was the reliance on generic attack strategies.
- The model was able to solve 30% of the challenges that targeted malware development bottleneck skills. This included the creation of cyber network attack and exploitation programs and the development of malware as infrastructure.
- The model was able to solve 11.11% of chal-

Eval Description	Type	Difficulty	Reliability
SQL injection in a website	Vulnerability D&E	Easy	44%
Network reconnaissance	Network Attack Simulation	Easy	40%
Search for a flag in a large file system, avoiding process-based detection. Full visibility to the detection method	Evasion	Easy	50%
Encrypt a large file system, avoiding process-based detection. Full visibility to the detection method	Evasion	Easy	44%
Search for a flag in a large file system, avoiding process-based detection. No visibility to the detection method.	Evasion	Medium	5%
Search for a flag in a large file system, avoiding Wazuh EDR detection. Full visibility to the detection method	Evasion	Medium	10%
Encrypt a large file system, avoiding process-based detection. No visibility to the detection method.	Evasion	Medium	10%
Path traversal 1-day discovery and exploitation in a static web server npm package	Vulnerability D&E	Medium	66%
Search for a flag in a large file system, avoiding Wazuh EDR detection. No visibility to the detection method.	Evasion	Hard	10%

Figure 11 | Evaluations that resulted in successful completions by the model.

allenges that targeted information gathering and reconnaissance. This included OSINT gathering, artifact prioritisation and network reconnaissance from an insiders' and outsiders' perspective.

When estimating the success rate of the model at tasks of varying cyber capability levels, we found that the model was able to solve 50% of tasks requiring cybersecurity apprentice level skills consistently (easy level of difficulty) whereas the model had limited success at tasks requiring cybersecurity practitioner or expert attack levels (medium and high difficulty challenges).

Overall, we judge that the model still lacks the skills necessary for real-world operations, and is therefore incapable of either carrying out end-to-end attacks or significantly assisting with high impact cyber attacks.

Observed Failure Modes. The most common

failure modes observed fall into two clusters: long-range syntactic accuracy and strategic reasoning over attack strategies. The empirical results indicate that the model often makes simple syntactic mistakes like invoking the wrong flags or hallucinating a parameter for command line tools. This issue is especially relevant when achieving an adversarial goal requires a long sequence of interactions, increasing the likelihood that the model makes a syntactic mistake in one of the steps.

The second cluster of failure modes pertains to the ability of the model to devise, plan and reason over novel attack strategies. The empirical results indicate that the model tends to either default to generic attack strategies or in some cases gets stuck in a loop of trying subtle variants of the same strategies. This can help explain the relatively low performance on medium and expert level evaluations that require creativity




Figure 12 | Challenge solve rates across different stages of the attack chain.

6.2. Insights for Defenses

By integrating an understanding of how the most impactful/likely patterns of attack prevalent in the real-world are impacted by current AI capabilities, organizations can better prioritize risks by understanding which AI-enabled adversarial techniques are most likely to be used and have the greatest potential impact on the organization.

The framework provides a method to focus on high-priority AI-enabled techniques that adversaries are likely to employ, allowing organizations to focus their efforts on defending against the most critical threats. In this section we outline several ways in which this framework for assessing AI cyber capabilities can inform defensive efforts.

Threat coverage gap assessment. Structuring the results of cyber capability evaluations using an attack chain framework helps us map emerging AI-enabled cyber capabilities onto specific phases of attack that are likely to benefit from emerging capabilities to identify gaps in defenses. This framework can be used to identify the cy-




Figure 13 | Solve rates as a function of challenge difficulty.

berattack patterns that are most likely to change due to emergent AI capabilities and inform threat coverage to proactively address new viable attack pathways enabled by AI capabilities. This process can help reveal the highest-priority areas where security teams should focus on implementing threat detection or mitigation solutions.

Based on the evaluations outlined above one of the capabilities that attained the highest average score across evaluations was evasion and operational security. The operational security evals focused on assessing the ability of the model to conduct evasion and obfuscation, maintaining persistence and evading detection after initial access has been achieved. These techniques are primarily seen in the later stages of the cyberattack chain, particularly in the following:

- **Installation:** Attackers may use evasion techniques to avoid detection when installing malware on a system. This could involve techniques like:
 - Side-loading benign signed executables
 - Living-of-the-land chains that execute malicious code in the memory
 - Using rootkits to hide their presence
 - Disabling security software
- **Command and Control (C2):** Once attackers have established a foothold, they use command and control channels to communicate with the compromised system. Evasion techniques are crucial here to avoid detection:
 - Using encrypted communication channels
 - Hiding C2 traffic within legitimate network traffic

While some preparatory actions in earlier stages (like weaponization) might include elements of potential evasion, the evaluations provided evidence that the model is moderately effective at aiding attackers in maintaining access and achieving their objectives without being detected.

Development and Deployment of Targeted Mitigations After mapping emerging AI-enabled cyber capabilities onto specific phases of attack and conducting a defensive gap assessment we

proceed to develop targeted safeguards to mitigate the misuse of specific cyber capabilities across the attack lifecycle by iterating on the following protocol within our Frontier Safety Framework [Google DeepMind \(2025\)](#).

- A suite of safeguards targeting the capability is developed/improved. This includes, as appropriate, safety fine-tuning, misuse filtering and detection, and response protocols.
- The robustness of these mitigations is assessed against the risk posed through assurance evaluations and threat modeling research. The assessment takes the form of a safety case ([Goemans et al., 2024](#)), taking into account factors such as the likelihood and consequences of misuse.

As both model capabilities and threat actor tactics, techniques and procedures are not static, we periodically assess the robustness of the deployed safeguards through internal and external red-teaming and incorporate updated cyber capability evaluations to our threat models.

Grounding AI-enabled Adversary Emulation: In the previous section we outlined how our framework informs the development of mitigations to mitigate the misuse of cyber capabilities. However, this framework can also be used as a proactive approach to informing adversary emulation. Adversary emulation is a process that can be used to assess the security of a system. This is achieved by applying threat intelligence about specific adversaries and their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to emulate the threat. The focus of adversary emulation is to verify that an organization can detect and/or mitigate adversarial activity at all stages of the attack chain.

Our framework can allow defenders to more effectively test their networks and defenses by enabling red teams to more accurately model AI-enabled adversary behavior (Figure 15). By combining known adversary tactics, techniques and procedures with grounding evidence of how emerging AI capabilities will impact the cost associated with executing specific phases of an attack, red teams can more accurately create adversary emulation scenarios that can test and verify de-




Figure 14 | Heatmap of potential for cost reduction of specific phases of the attack chain based on evaluations of current model capabilities.

fenses against malicious actors that leverage AI to achieve greater scale and impact.

Generating emulation plans that combine 1) knowledge of known adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures with 2) prevalence of use of AI in specific phases of an attack (Figure 7), along with 3) evidence of AI-enabled cost reduction capabilities across specific phases of an attack pattern (Figure 14) can help inform defenders and threat hunting teams to align and improve defensive measures.

Benchmarking defenses: This approach can also serve as a benchmark for assessing the potential effectiveness of defenses by understanding the costs they impose on leveraging AI to conduct specific phases of the attack chain (Figure 16).

Cyber defense strategies aim to increase the resources, time, and risk required for attackers to achieve their goals. Within the context of AI-enabled cyberattacks, organizations have a wide range of defensive measures that can be considered (model-level interventions like safety fine-tuning, as well as post-deployment interventions like input classifiers and rate limits, etc). However, there is currently no comprehensive framework or benchmark to evaluate malicious use of AI defenses across the entire cyberattack chain. Our framework can also be used to assess the potential effectiveness of interventions that force attackers to expend greater effort, making AI-enabled attacks less efficient and potentially deterring their use altogether in some instances.

7. Related Work

Artificial intelligence has long been a cornerstone of cybersecurity operations. From malware detection to network traffic analysis, predictive machine learning models and other narrow AI applications have been used in cybersecurity for decades. Recent developments in frontier AI systems have ushered a cambrian explosion of research demonstrating a range of defensive applications and use cases. Research efforts have demonstrated the use of frontier AI systems in identifying vulnerabilities across codebases (Akuthota et al., 2023; Al-Karaki et al., 2024; Du et al., 2024; Li et al., 2021; Lu et al., 2024), summarizing incidents (Aminanto et al., 2020; Ban et al., 2023; Khare et al., 2023), facilitating rapid incident response (Hays and White, 2024), and performing a wide array of other tasks that are foundational to modern cybersecurity best practices (Alam et al., 2024). DARPA's AIxCC competition (DARPA, 2025) has demonstrated impressive outcomes with participants developing fully autonomous systems capable of finding, exploiting, and fixing vulnerabilities in real open-source projects using general-purpose AI (Du et al., 2024; Ristea et al., 2024; Ruan et al., 2024).

While these recent research efforts point to benefits AI can bring to cybersecurity defense, the dual-use nature of many capabilities in cybersecurity, where the same technology can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes, necessitates a robust approach to understanding and managing these risks. To this end there has been a growing body of research that focuses on developing methods and frameworks to evaluate the potential risks associated with increasingly




Figure 15 | Our framework can allow defenders to more effectively test their networks and defenses by enabling red teams to more accurately model AI-enabled adversary behavior by generating emulation plans that combine knowledge of known adversary tactics, techniques and procedures with evidence of AI-enabled cost reduction capabilities across specific phases of an attack pattern.

capable AI systems in the cyber domain.

7.1. Capture the Flag Challenges

To date, the most widely used approach to evaluate LLMs for offensive cyber capabilities has been the use of cyber security Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges or tasks. CTF challenges are puzzles related to computer security scenarios spanning a wide range of topics, including cryptography, reverse engineering, web exploitation, forensics, and miscellaneous topics. LLMs are interfaced with CTF environments and tasked with completing challenges with the aim to capture and print hidden ‘flags,’ which are short strings of characters or specific files, proving successful completion of a challenge. PentestGPT (Deng et al., 2023), CyberSecEval 3 (Bhatt et al., 2024; Wan et al., 2024), Google DeepMind’s LLM evaluations (Phuong et al., 2024), PenHeal (Huang and Zhu, 2023), AutoAttacker (Xu et al., 2024), Cybench (Zhang et al., 2024), EnIGMA (Abramovich et al., 2024), InterCode-CTF (Yang et al., 2023a) and others employ CTF benchmarks. Some, like Cy-

berSecEval 3 (Wan et al., 2024), also assess “copilot” scenarios, where human operators utilize LLMs as tools, reflecting a more realistic attacker profile. Efforts like (Lu et al., 2024) and (Ban et al., 2023) focus on specific and narrowly focused benchmarks for Linux privilege escalation, while CyberSecEval 3 features a broader range of challenges (albeit limited to a subset of phases of the attack chain).

A common drawback of existing CTF-style challenges lies in the artificial constraints and simplified scenarios that are not reflective of real-world attackers and conditions posed by the challenges which create a skewed representation of attacker behavior and in turn limit accurate assessment of a model’s cyberattack capabilities. Real-world enterprise environments often consist of hundreds, if not thousands, of interconnected hosts, each with unique vulnerabilities and configurations. Attackers must meticulously enumerate and prioritize these targets, navigating a vast landscape of potential entry points. In contrast, commonly used CTFs typically present a model with a single “box” or a limited set of targets, significantly



Figure 16 | AI-enabled cyberattack defense as cost imposition: our framework can help defenders benchmark the effectiveness of defensive interventions across the attack chain.

narrowing the scope of the challenge.

7.2. Multiple Choice and Free Response Tests

Multiple-choice question benchmarks are also a common approach to evaluating the cyber capabilities of models. These offer measurability and scalability through synthetic question generation. CyberSecEval (Wan et al., 2024), CyberMetric (Tihanyi et al., 2024), SecEval (Wan et al., 2024), SecQA (Liu, 2023), and (Tann et al., 2023) utilize such benchmarks. However, challenges exist in crafting questions that resist memorization and accurately reflect the offensive cyber domain. CyberSecEval also employs free-response questions, evaluated for malicious effectiveness by another auto-rater LLM. More recently, OCCULT (Kouremetis et al., 2025) introduced a multiple-choice benchmark designed to evaluate an LLM’s knowledge of offensive cybersecurity tactics.

7.3. Scaffolding and Capability Elicitation

Another emerging area of research supporting the evaluation of cyberattack capabilities of frontier models has been the development of approaches to capability elicitation and proper model scaffolding to enable the measurement of upper bound estimates on model capabilities. Some of these systems are very lightweight, designed to merely support the action and observation loop between the LLM agent and the evaluation: examples include

Cybench (Zhang et al., 2024) and InterCode-CTF (Yang et al., 2023a). Other LLM systems maintain a moderate set of scaffolding and integrated functionality, to include Vulnhuntr (Du et al., 2024) and AutoAttacker (Xu et al., 2024). And, in line with a natural progression, are model workflows systems and agents like SWE Agent (Yang et al., 2024) that rig extensive tool interfaces, multiple LLMs/models for different functionality purposes and larger sub-components for observation parsing & summarizing, reasoning/planning over action selection and sequences; and ad-hoc human feedback.

PentestGPT (Deng et al., 2023), Project Naptime (Google, 2025c), EnIGMA (Abramovich et al., 2024), and most recently the multi-stage attack LLM interface, Incalmo (Singer et al., 2025), are examples of agent systems that attempt to develop more comprehensive scaffolding solutions that provide models with access to traditional offensive cybersecurity research tools including programming interpreters, debuggers, code analyzers, web APIs and task management.

While current approaches to evaluating the offensive cybersecurity capabilities of frontier models offer a growing range of tools and benchmarks targeting specific narrow capabilities, it often remains unclear how to translate evaluation findings into relevant insights that empower cybersecurity defenders to make decisions on targeted interventions and mitigations across specific phases

of the attack chain. This paper focuses on bridging this divide between risk identification and insights that can help defenders prioritize where to deploy targeted defenses.

8. Conclusion

This paper presents a novel framework for evaluating frontier AI's impact on cyber capabilities, focusing on the end-to-end attack chain. Grounded in over 12,000 real-world instances of attempted AI misuse in cyberattacks, this framework bridges the gap between cyber evaluations and defenses by enabling defenders to prioritize targeted mitigations. We curated a representative collection of cyberattack chain archetypes and a benchmark of new challenges, which enabled us to conduct a bottleneck analysis to identify specific phases where AI-driven cost disruptions are most likely.

The framework illuminates potential cost disruptions across attack phases, facilitates the prioritization of targeted mitigations, and evaluates their effectiveness by quantifying the costs imposed on attackers. Furthermore, it empowers red teams to more accurately model AI-enabled adversary behavior, generating emulation plans that combine known tactics, techniques, and procedures with evidence of AI-driven cost reductions.

Our evaluations revealed that current AI cyber evaluations often overlook critical areas. While much attention is given to AI-enabled vulnerability exploitation and novel exploit development, our analysis highlights AI's significant potential in under-researched phases like evasion, detection avoidance, obfuscation, and persistence. Specifically, AI's ability to enhance these stages presents a substantial, yet often underestimated, threat.

While acknowledged in prior research, we also confirm the critical importance of assessing and counteracting the potential for misuse of models for capabilities like network reconnaissance, widespread vulnerability exploitation, and the execution of long-term cyberattacks in vulnerable environments.

We designed our evaluation framework to be general enough to evolve with the progression

of frontier AI capabilities. It offers an advantage in the face of AI-enabled adversaries, because it equips defenders with decision-relevant insights to enhance their cyber defenses. Mitigating misuse requires a community-wide effort, including robust guardrails and safeguards from AI developers, as well as the evolution of defensive techniques that account for AI-driven TTP changes.

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A. Bottleneck Analysis

Phishing and spear phishing

Bottlenecks:

- Gathering information about the target (individual, organization, or group)
- Creating a malicious payload (e.g., malware-laden attachment, malicious link)
- Transmitting the malicious payload to the target

AI Uplift Potential:

- Automating Reconnaissance: AI-powered tools can quickly gather and analyze vast amounts of OSINT data to identify potential victims and tailor phishing lures.
- Improving Weaponization: AI can generate highly convincing phishing emails and websites, making it more difficult for users to identify them as malicious.

- Personalizing Attacks: AI can analyze individual user behavior to craft highly targeted phishing attacks that are more likely to be successful.

Malware

Bottlenecks:

- Development of new malware: Requires reverse engineering, understanding vulnerabilities, coding skills, and potentially evading detection mechanisms.
- Evading detection: Signature-based detection, sandboxing, behavioral analysis. Malware needs to be polymorphic or metamorphic to avoid detection.
- Distribution/Delivery: Getting the malware onto target systems can be challenging. Exploiting vulnerabilities, social engineering, supply chain attacks.
- Maintaining persistence: Ensuring the malware stays on the system even after reboots or security scans.
- Command and Control (C2) communication: Establishing and maintaining covert communication channels for control and data exfiltration.

AI Uplift Potential:

- Automated malware generation: AI can automate the creation of new malware variants, including polymorphic and metamorphic malware to evade signature-based detection.
- Intelligent evasion techniques: AI can learn and develop techniques to evade sandboxing and behavioral analysis by mimicking benign behavior or detecting sandbox environments.
- Automated vulnerability exploitation: AI can be used to find and exploit vulnerabilities to deliver and install malware automatically.
- Enhanced C2 communication: AI can establish more resilient and stealthy C2 channels, potentially using techniques like domain generation algorithms (DGAs) or encrypted communications that adapt to network conditions.

- Targeted malware: AI can tailor malware payloads and behaviors to specific targets, increasing effectiveness and reducing detection.

Denial-of-Service (DoS)

Bottlenecks:

- Amplification: Generating enough traffic to overwhelm a target infrastructure can be difficult without amplification techniques.
- Bypassing mitigation strategies: Rate limiting, firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, content delivery networks (CDNs).
- Maintaining attack persistence: Keeping the attack going continuously can be resource intensive, and mitigation strategies might eventually become effective.
- Attribution and anonymity: Hiding the source of the attack can be challenging and important for avoiding repercussions.

AI Uplift Potential:

- Intelligent amplification attacks: AI could optimize amplification techniques to maximize the impact of DoS attacks with fewer resources, potentially by dynamically adapting attack vectors.
- Automated DDoS orchestration: AI can automate the orchestration of large-scale DDoS attacks, managing botnets and attack vectors more efficiently.
- Evasion of mitigation: AI can learn and adapt to bypass rate limiting, firewalls, and other mitigation strategies by identifying weaknesses in defensive systems and dynamically changing attack patterns.
- Creation of more complex and stealthy DoS attacks: AI might enable development of application-layer DoS attacks that are harder to detect and mitigate than simple volumetric attacks.
- Autonomous botnet management: AI could manage botnets more autonomously and effectively, improving their resilience and attack capabilities.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)

Bottlenecks:

- Network positioning: Gaining a position on the network path between two communicating parties (e.g., ARP poisoning, rogue Wi-Fi access points).
- Traffic interception: Capturing and potentially decrypting network traffic. Encryption (HTTPS, TLS) makes interception and decryption harder.
- Real-time traffic analysis: Analyzing intercepted traffic in real-time to extract valuable information or identify opportunities for manipulation.
- Traffic manipulation/injection: Modifying traffic without being detected, which requires understanding the protocols and application logic.
- Maintaining stealth: Avoiding detection while intercepting and potentially manipulating traffic.

AI Uplift Potential:

- Automated network positioning: AI can automate network reconnaissance and identify optimal positions for MitM attacks.
- Intelligent traffic analysis: AI can perform deep packet inspection and real-time analysis of encrypted traffic to identify patterns, vulnerabilities, or sensitive data even without full decryption, potentially using techniques like traffic analysis and machine learning.
- Dynamic traffic manipulation: AI could automate the dynamic manipulation of traffic based on real-time analysis, enabling more sophisticated and context-aware attacks.
- Bypassing encryption or finding weaknesses in implementations: AI could potentially find subtle weaknesses in encryption protocols or implementations that can be exploited for partial or full decryption in certain scenarios.
- Automated injection of malicious content: AI can inject malicious content into traffic streams in a way that is less likely to be detected and more likely to achieve the attacker's objectives

SQL Injection

Bottlenecks:

- Finding vulnerable parameters: Identifying input fields in web applications that are vulnerable to SQL injection.
- Crafting effective injection payloads: Developing SQL queries that can bypass input validation and achieve the desired outcome (data exfiltration, modification, etc.).
- Bypassing web application firewalls (WAFs): WAFs are designed to detect and block common SQL injection attacks.
- Exploiting complex SQL injection scenarios: Blind SQL injection, time-based injection, second-order injection can be more complex to exploit.
- Automating the exploitation process: Manually testing for and exploiting SQL injection can be time-consuming.

AI Uplift Potential:

- Automated vulnerability scanning and identification: AI can crawl web applications and automatically identify potential SQL injection vulnerabilities with greater accuracy and speed.
- Intelligent payload crafting: AI can generate SQL injection payloads that are more likely to bypass input validation and WAFs, potentially using techniques like mutation and adversarial examples.
- Automated exploitation of complex scenarios: AI can automate the exploitation of blind, time-based, and second-order SQL injection vulnerabilities, significantly reducing the time and effort required.
- Learning WAF evasion techniques: AI can learn from WAF responses and develop evasion techniques that are more effective.
- Optimized data exfiltration: AI can optimize data exfiltration strategies after successful SQL injection to minimize detection and maximize data retrieved.

Zero-Day Attack

Bottlenecks:

- Vulnerability discovery: Finding previously unknown vulnerabilities is extremely difficult and time-consuming, requiring deep expertise and resources.
- Exploit development: Creating a reliable exploit for a zero-day vulnerability that works across different systems and is not easily detected.
- Weaponization and delivery before patching: Attacks need to be carried out before the vulnerability is publicly disclosed and patched, requiring speed and stealth.
- Maintaining secrecy of the vulnerability: Keeping the zero-day vulnerability secret is crucial for its long-term effectiveness.
- Target selection and impact maximization: Choosing targets where the zero-day exploit will have maximum impact.

AI Uplift Potential for Zero-Day Attacks:

- Accelerated vulnerability discovery: AI can analyze codebases and software systems at scale to identify potential zero-day vulnerabilities much faster than traditional methods, using techniques like fuzzing, symbolic execution, and machine learning for anomaly detection in code.
- Automated exploit generation: AI can automate the process of generating exploits for discovered vulnerabilities, reducing the time and attack barrier for exploit development.
- Proactive vulnerability prediction: AI might be able to predict potential vulnerability types or locations in software based on code patterns and past vulnerability data, guiding vulnerability research efforts.
- Stealthy zero-day weaponization: AI can help create zero-day exploits and delivery mechanisms that are more stealthy and harder to detect, maximizing the window of opportunity before patching.
- Targeted zero-day attacks: AI can analyze potential targets and identify those where a specific zero-day exploit